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Abstract 
It has been argued that adults underestimate the extent to which their preferences will 
change over time. We sought to determine whether such mis-predictions are the result of a 
difficulty imagining that one’s own current and future preferences may differ or whether it also 
characterizes our predictions about the future preferences of others. We used a perspective- 
taking task in which we asked young people how much they liked stereotypically-young-person 
items (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations) and stereotypically-old-person items (e.g., jazz, 
playing bridge) now, and how much they would like them in the distant future (i.e., when they 
are 70 years old). Participants also made these same predictions for a generic same-age, same-
sex peer. In a third condition, participants predicted how much a generic older (i.e., age 70) 
same-sex adult would like items from both categories today. Participants predicted less change 
between their own current and future preferences than between the current and future 
preferences of a peer. However, participants estimated that, compared to a current older adult 
today, their peer would like stereotypically-young items more in the future and stereotypically-
old items less. The fact that peers’ distant-future estimated preferences were different from the 
ones they made for “current” older adults suggests that even though underestimation of change 
of preferences over time is attenuated when thinking about others, a bias still exists. 
 
Keywords: Future thinking, Projection bias, Presentism bias, Self, Other, Aging 
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Introduction 
“It is always thus, impelled by a state of mind which is destined not to last, that we make our 
irrevocable decisions” (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Vol. II: Within a Budding Grove).  
Adults spend a considerable amount of time thinking about their futures (D'Argembeau, 
Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011). Over the course of a typical day, we think about leisure 
activities, work, errands, and relationship issues that may occur both in our near and distant 
futures. Despite the prominence of these thoughts about the future in our daily lives, research 
consistently shows that adults mis-predict their future preferences and values (for reviews, see 
Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). For example, in a recent 
study, Quoidbach, Gilbert and Wilson (2013) found that although adults reported that their 
personalities, values, and preferences had changed substantially in the past 10 years, they 
thought that they would change very little in the next 10 years. These authors proposed the 
term “end of history illusion” to capture adults’ underestimation of the extent to which they 
would change in the future.  
The mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are still debated. One possible 
mechanism is the “presentism bias”, a tendency to interpret past and future selves in relation to 
present motives and knowledge (Cameron, Wilson, & Ross, 2004; Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002). 
A similar type of explanation is the “projection bias” (Loewenstein et al., 2003) which entails 
projecting our current preferences, values, or feelings into the future, even when these may no 
longer be relevant. Other explanations have focused on the characteristics of future simulations 
themselves, such as their unrepresentative, abbreviated, and decontextualized character 
(Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Mis-predictions about the future are not trivial because they can lead 
people to make decisions in the present that are based on preferences, emotions, and 
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personality traits that may shift in the future. For example, the young person who gets a large 
neck tattoo today may, in 20 years, regret it.  
An interesting question to ask is whether such biases are more prevalent – or appear 
exclusively – when considering one’s own preferences, emotions, and personality traits, or 
whether these same biases also affect our judgments about others. This is of theoretical interest 
because it may explain the source of people’s mis-predictions and also qualify the particular 
explanation given to account for these mis-predictions. For example, by the “end of history 
illusion” and “presentism bias” accounts, people have difficulty predicting change. However, is 
this difficulty situated solely in the context of self-predictions (i.e., predicting that one’s own 
preferences will change), or is it situated in the context of predicting change more broadly (i.e., 
predicting that everyone’s preferences will change)? To our knowledge, no previous study has 
directly compared how adults simultaneously predict their own and other people’s changes in 
preferences in the future. Doing so will help to determine the parameters of “prediction” biases 
and may also shed light on their underlying mechanisms.  
Research on perspective-taking has shown that, when thinking about others, we 
typically use our own perspective as a starting point or “judgmental anchor” (Davis, Hoch, & 
Ragsdale, 1986; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Nickerson, 1999), and represent 
what others would think or feel in a situation by imagining ourselves in this same situation 
(Decety & Grezes, 2006; Goldman, 2002; Gordon, 1986). Nonetheless, certain future thinking 
biases like the optimism bias, by which we overestimate the likelihood of positive events in our 
future (Sharot, 2011), are attenuated when thinking about others (Baker & Emery, 1993; 
Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin, & Hudson, 2013). Indeed, a vast body of research has shown that 
when comparing ourselves to others, we tend to think that we are better or less typical than 
average, and have a brighter future (reviewed in Chambers, 2008). In the case of preferences, 
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these “false uniqueness perceptions” may lead us to think that our own preferences are wise 
and therefore unlikely to change in the future. In contrast, the preferences of an average peer 
might be judged as less wise, and therefore more likely to change as he/she gets older.   
Reviewing relevant neuroimaging research, Buckner and Carroll (2007; see also Hassabis 
and Maguire, 2007) proposed that a core brain network, including frontal, medial temporal and 
parietal cortices support various forms of self-projection: remembering our past, thinking about 
our future (i.e., prospection) and taking the perspective of others (i.e., theory of mind). 
Accordingly, if similar neurocognitive mechanisms are involved in projecting ourselves in the 
future and in taking another person‘s perspective, one might speculate that mis-predictions 
about the future will be similar when considering our own or someone else’s perspective.  
However, some differences in the neural correlates of self-versus-other judgments have 
been observed, with a number of brain regions responding preferentially to self-relevant 
information. Among these brain regions, the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex is known to be 
important for future thinking, as patients with selective lesions in this area were reported to 
make decisions that illustrated “myopia for the future” (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000) 
and an overestimation of self-monitoring abilities (Robinson, Calamia, Glascher, Bruss, & Tranel, 
2014). Interestingly, a number of studies have reported evidence of a self-to-other gradient in 
this brain region: more ventral parts were shown to respond preferentially to information 
related to self, while more dorsal parts were more active when taking the perspective of others 
(D'Argembeau et al., 2007; Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Murray, Schaer, & Debbane, 
2012). Other brain regions like the insula and the caudate nucleus were also found to be more 
active for self- than other-related judgments (Denny et al., 2012).  
Taken together, the evidence shows that the neurocognitive processes that allow us to 
consider our own versus another person’s perspective are largely - but not fully - overlapping. 
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Considering our own perspective may have unique additional properties, as shown by the 
contribution of brain regions involved in reward (i.e., caudate nucleus), interoceptive awareness 
(i.e., insula) and personal value (i.e., ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Interestingly, this set of 
brain regions is also associated with the most emotional, visceral aspects of decision-making 
processes or, the so-called “gut feeling” (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 
2006). Accordingly, because of the specific properties of this self-relevance network, the 
projection bias that has repeatedly been described when projecting oneself in the future may 
manifest itself differently or be absent when thinking about others. For instance, the 
“presentism bias” observed during future thinking could be partly due to the inherent qualities 
of this network of brain regions, coding for the visceral, somato-sensory aspects of current self-
relevance. Loewenstein (1996) has described how “immediately experienced visceral factors” 
may explain projection bias. However, specific characteristics of future simulations themselves 
such as their unrepresentative, abbreviated, and decontextualized character (Gilbert & Wilson, 
2007) may be equally operative when thinking about one’s own and others’ futures. 
Accordingly, the projection bias may be attenuated, but still present, when thinking about 
another person’s future as compared to thinking about one’s own future. As noted above, such 
a pattern has been described for the optimism bias (Grysman et al., 2013). 
The goal of the present study was to test this hypothesis. We investigated whether an 
underestimation of change of preferences over time is specific to self or is also present when 
making predictions about others. We used a perspective-taking task in which we asked young 
adults how much they liked stereotypically young-person things (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure 
vacations) and stereotypically old-person things (e.g., jazz, playing bridge) “now” and how much 
they will like them in the distant future (i.e., when they are 70). Participants also had to estimate 
how much a generic peer of their age and gender liked these same items now and in the future. 
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Finally, participants had to rate how much an older adult (aged 70) liked these items. We 
hypothesized that participants would underestimate how much their preferences would change 
over time and that they would predict less change for themselves than for their peers. In 
addition, we predicted that this underestimation of change, although attenuated, would still be 
present when estimating their peer’s preferences; that is, we expected that participants would 
judge that their peers would like stereotypically-young items more, and stereotypically-old items 
less, in the future than a generic older adult does now. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Participants  
134 participants (28 males) took part in the perspective-taking task. They were recruited 
via the Integrated System of Participation in Research (ISPR) of the School of Psychology at the 
University of Ottawa. Participants obtained course credit for their participation. Their mean age 
was 19 years (± 2.54, range: 18-33) and they had completed 14 years (± 2.17, range: 11-23) of 
education on average. All participants signed an online informed consent form accepted by the 
Ethics Board of the University of Ottawa.  
 
Perspective-Taking Task 
Selection of stimuli 
We asked 22 young adults who did not participate in the experiment (4 males, mean 
age: 24 ± 4.27, range: 19-34; mean level of education: 17 years ± 3.01, range: 12-22) how much 
they liked 21 stereotypically-young-person things (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations) and 
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21 stereotypically-old-person things (e.g., jazz, playing bridge) now, and how much they would 
like these items when they are 70 years old. In each trial, participants responded using a 7 point 
Likert scale: 1-Strongly dislike, 2-Dislike, 3-Dislike somewhat, 4-Neutral, 5-Like somewhat, 6-Like, 
7-Strongly like. We then selected the items that differed most in ratings according to time (Now 
versus Future). Twelve stereotypically-young-person things and 12 stereotypically-old-person 
things were selected as differing significantly in their ratings (i.e., young items being preferred in 
the present relative to the future, and old items being preferred in the future relative to the 
present; see Appendix for the list of stimuli).  
 We subsequently verified that these items also showed this effect in the participants of 
our perspective-taking experiment (N=134; see details above). All items differed significantly in 
their preference ratings according to Time: Stereotypically young items were preferred in the 
present relative to the future, and stereotypically old items were preferred in the future relative 
to the present (all ps<.03). 
 
Task design 
In the perspective-taking task, we asked participants how much they liked 
stereotypically-young-person things (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations) versus 
stereotypically-old-person things (e.g., jazz, playing bridge) now, and how much they would like 
them when they are 70 years old. We also asked them to rate these items for two generic same-
sex adults: a same-age peer and an older adult. The same 7-point Likert scale as in the norming 
study was used (from 1-Strongly dislike to 7-Strongly like, see above). Participants completed 
the task online using an internet questionnaire (https://www.surveymonkey.com/). The 
following instructions were used: “In this experiment you are going to be asked about likes and 
dislikes. Sometimes you will be asked about your own likes and dislikes, and sometimes about 
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somebody else’s. Some of the questions will be about right now, and some will be about the 
future. For each trial you will be told whose likes and dislikes you are being asked about, and 
whether we are asking you about right now or the future. You will be asked to rate the extent to 
which you or someone else would like something or not. For the trials in which you will have to 
judge the likes and dislikes of someone else, you will have to think about: someone else your 
age or a 70-year-old.” 
Separate male and female versions of the task were created. In trials in which 
participants were asked to take a perspective other than their own, the photograph of an 
unknown face from the same gender as the participant was presented: It was either “Someone 
else your age” or “a 70-year-old”. There were 3 perspectives (self, peer, older adult), and 2 
times (now versus future) that corresponded to 5 separate blocks of trials: Self-Now, Self-
Future, Peer-Now, Peer-Future, Older adult-Now. Blocks were presented in random order. 
Within each block, items (stereotypically-young versus stereotypically-old) were also presented 
randomly. 
 
Statistical analyses 
To test the extent to which predictions about one’s own and a peer’s future preferences 
were similar/different, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on preference ratings with 
Perspective (Self versus Peer), Time (Now versus Future) and Item type (stereotypically-young 
versus stereotypically-old-person things) as within-subject factors.  
To test the extent to which predictions of self and peer’s preferences would differ from 
an older adult’s perspective, we conducted two additional repeated-measures ANOVAs. These 
ANOVAs included Perspective (Self versus Peer versus Older-adult) and Item type 
(stereotypically-young versus stereotypically-old-person things) as within-subject factors (time 
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was not included because the older adult was only asked about in the now condition). One of 
these analyses was conducted with the Now conditions, and the other with the Future 
conditions of Self and Peer. Sex of participants was added as a between-subjects factor in all 
analyses. 
Partial eta-squared (
) is indicated as a measure of effect size in all analyses. 
 
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
 
Results 
Main Analysis 
The repeated-measures ANOVA on preference ratings revealed main effects of 
perspective (F1,133 = 34.26, p<.001,  
= .21), time (F1,133 = 151.35, p<.001,  
= .53) and a three-
way interaction between perspective, time, and item type (F1,133 = 79.10, p<.001,  
= .37). No 
interaction with sex of participants was found (all ps<.2).  
 
Analyses by Time period 
Now Condition 
Analyses for the now conditions showed main effects of perspective (F1,133 = 30.71, 
p<.001,  
= .19), and item type (F1,133 = 440.76, p<.001, 
= .77), as well as an interaction 
between perspective and item type (F1,133 = 75.12, p<.001, 
= .36). No interaction with sex of 
participants was found (all ps<.5). Subsequent analyses for stereotypically-young items revealed 
that participants attributed higher preference ratings to their peer (mean: 5.56) than to 
themselves (mean: 4.88; F1,133 = 85.84, p<.001,  
= .39). In contrast, for stereotypically-old 
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items, participants gave slightly higher preference ratings to themselves (mean: 3.81) than to 
their peer (mean: 3.58; F1,133 = 15.06, p<.001,  
 = .10).  
These analyses thus suggest that participants rated themselves as liking “young” items 
less now than their peers, whereas they rated themselves as liking “old” items more (see Figure 
1). 
 
Future Condition 
Analyses for the future conditions revealed main effects of perspective (F1,133 = 15.59, 
p<.001,  
 = .11), and item type (F1,133 = 211.33, p<.001,  
 = .61), as well as an interaction 
between perspective and item type (F1,133 = 7.24, p=.008,  
= .05). No interaction with sex of 
participants was found (all ps<.2). Further analyses for stereotypically-young items showed no 
significant difference in ratings between self (mean: 3.34) and peer (mean: 3.31). In contrast, for 
stereotypically-old items, participants gave slightly higher preference ratings to peer (mean: 4.9) 
than to themselves (mean: 4.5; F1,133 = 20.69, p<.001,  
 = .14 ). 
Thus, although participants judged that both they and their peers would show similar 
preference levels for young items in the future, they judged that their peers would prefer old 
items more in the future than they would (Figure 1). 
 
Analyses by Item Type  
Stereotypically-young items 
Analyses of preference ratings for stereotypically-young items revealed main effects of 
time (F1,133 = 658.69, p<.001,  
= .83), perspective (F1,133 = 27.71, p<.001,  
= .17), and an 
interaction between these 2 factors (F1,133 = 16.75, p<.001,  
= .31). Subsequent analyses 
showed that, as expected, young items were preferred now relative to the future both for self 
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(F1,133 = 447.24, p<.001,  
= .77) and for a peer (F1,133 = 514.97, p<.001,  
= .79). Importantly, 
however, the difference in ratings was greater for peer (5.56 versus 3.31) than for self (4.88 
versus 3.34). Thus, as predicted, participants predicted less change in their own future 
preferences, than they did for a same-age peer. No interaction with sex of participants was 
found for any of the variables (all ps<.3). 
 
Stereotypically-old items 
Analyses of preference ratings for stereotypically-old items revealed a main effect of 
time (F1,133 = 261.21, p<.001,  
 = .66), and an interaction between time and perspective (F1,133 = 
52.57, p<.001,  
 = .28). Again, as expected, old items were rated as preferred in the future 
relative to now, both for self (F1,133 = 138.05, p<.001,  
= .51)  and for a peer (F1,133 = 236.78, 
p<.001,  
= .64), but the difference in ratings was slightly greater for peer (4.9 versus 3.6) than 
self (4.5 versus 3.8), which again suggests that participants were predicting less change for self 
than another generic peer (see Figure 1). No interaction with sex of participants was found for 
any of the variables (all ps<.4). 
 
 
Comparisons of young and older adults 
Comparison between self, peer and older adult “Now”  
To verify that participants did indeed judge that they and their peers would show higher 
preference ratings for young items now and, conversely, lower preference ratings for old-items 
now than an older adult would, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA comparing older 
adults, peer and self in the “Now” condition. This analysis revealed a main effect of perspective 
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(F2,266 = 80.98, p<.001,  
= .38) and an interaction between perspective and item type (F2,266 = 
699.37, p<.001,  
= .84).  
 
Stereotypically-young items 
For stereotypically-young items, there was a main effect of perspective (F2,266 = 628.04, 
p<.001,  
= .83). Follow-up analyses showed that, for these items, participants gave higher 
preference ratings to a peer (mean: 5.56; F1,133 = 866.25, p<.001; 
= .87) and to themselves 
(mean: 4.88; F1,133 = 687.90, p<.001; 
 = .84) as compared to an older adult (mean: 2.57).  
 
Stereotypically-old items 
For stereotypically-old items, there was also a main effect of perspective (F2,266 = 335.02, 
p<.001,  
= .72). Subsequent analyses showed that, for these items, participants attributed 
higher preference ratings to an older adult (mean: 5.40) as compared to a peer (mean: 3.58; 
F2,266 = 418.29, p<.001,  
= .76) and to themselves (mean: 3.81; F1,133 = 406.42, p<.001,  
= 
.75).   
These analyses thus showed that participants judged that they and their peers currently 
liked young items better and old items less than an older adult (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Comparison between older adult “Now”, and self and peer in the Future 
To determine whether the extent of predicted change of preferences of self and peer in 
the future were comparable to those of an older adult, we conducted a repeated-measures 
ANOVA comparing older adult “now” with peer and self in the Future condition. This analysis 
revealed main effects of perspective (F2,266 = 8.16, p<.001,  
= .06), item type  (F1,133 = 478.70, 
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p<.001,  
= .78), and an interaction between perspective and item type (F2,266 = 99.21, p<.001,  

= .43) .  
 
 
Stereotypically-young items 
For stereotypically-young items, there was a main effect of perspective (F2,266 = 65.54, 
p<.001,  
= .33). Follow-up analyses showed that, for these items, participants gave higher 
preference ratings to self (mean: 3.34; F1,133 = 111.212, p<.001,  
= .46) and peer (mean: 3.31;  
F1,133 = 99.77, p<.001,  
= .43) as compared to an older adult (mean: 2.57). 
 
Stereotypically-old items 
For stereotypically-old items, there was also a main effect of perspective (F2,266 = 82.91, 
p<.001,  
= .38). Subsequent analyses revealed that, for these items, participants gave higher 
preference ratings to an older adult (mean: 5.40) as compared to a peer (mean: 4.86;  F1,133 = 
73.66, p<.001,  
 = .36) or themselves (mean: 4.52; F1,133 = 161.19, p<.001,  
= .55). 
Together, these analyses suggest that even though participants estimated that their 
preferences and those of their peer would change in the future, these preferences would still 
differ from those of an older adult (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to test whether people’s tendency to underestimate 
the extent to which their preferences will change in the future is specific to self or also present 
when making predictions about others.  Participants predicted less change between their own 
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current and future preferences than between the current and future preferences of a generic 
same-sex peer. This was observed for preferences relating to stereotypically-old (e.g., jazz, 
playing bridge) as well as stereotypically-young (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations) items.  
However, differences in ratings between self and other were found both for current and 
future preferences. That is, participants thought that their peers currently liked stereotypically-
young items more and stereotypically-old items less than themselves. They also reported that 
other young people would like more stereotypically-old items than themselves in the future. 
These findings are reminiscent of the “false uniqueness” bias in reasoning that has been 
repeatedly demonstrated when comparing oneself to others (reviewed in Chambers, 2008). 
False uniqueness is our tendency to think that we are ‘better than average’, unique, or in the 
present case less typical, with respect to our abilities and personalities. Here, we found that 
items that were most relevant in the present for our young participants (i.e., stereotypically-
young items) were rated as more preferred by other young peers than self. Conversely, items 
that were more relevant in the future (i.e., stereotypically-old items) were rated as more 
preferred by others than self in the future. Our findings therefore indicate that false uniqueness 
biases are similar for judgments relating to the present and to the future. 
Interestingly, our participants did not have a strict “end of history illusion” (Quoidbach 
et al., 2013), as they still believed that their preferences would change over time. Indeed, 
judgments about the present as compared to the future were characterized by qualitatively 
similar inverted ratings for self and other: In both cases, participants gave higher preference 
ratings to stereotypically-young items in the present and to stereotypically-old items in the 
future. This supports the observation that people generally understand qualitatively the 
direction in which their preferences and tastes will change in the future (Loewenstein et al., 
2003). If participants had a strict presentism bias (Cameron et al., 2004) and only interpreted 
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future selves in relation to present motives, they would have predicted that their love of young 
items would be as strong in the future as in the present– though an important point, and one to 
which we return, is that we asked our participants to make predictions about a very distant 
future. 
Participants predicted that their preferences would change less over time than those of 
a generic peer. This difference in the magnitude of estimated change suggests that distinct 
mechanisms may underlie people’s judgments about their own and others’ current and future 
preferences. Moreover, such mechanisms may already differ early in development given that a 
recent study showed that preschoolers are better at predicting that a peer’s preferences will 
change in the future than they are at making this same prediction for self  (Bélanger, Atance, 
Varghese, Nguyen, & Vendetti, 2014). Nevertheless, our findings do not imply that an 
underestimation of change of preferences over time is specific to self. When participants were 
asked to judge the current preferences of an older adult, we found that the difference in 
preferences between stereotypically old and young items was rated as much more pronounced 
than for self and for a peer. More specifically, older adults were considered to currently like 
stereotypically-old items more, and stereotypically-young items less, than both self and another 
young adult would in the future. These results therefore indicate that even though 
underestimation of change of preferences over time is attenuated when thinking about others, 
the phenomenon is still present as the estimated change in preferences of others does not bring 
them to the level of “current” older adults’ preferences. However, another possible 
interpretation of these findings is that our participants anticipated differences in preferences for 
different generations (i.e., current older adults versus future older adults). While our design 
does not allow us to rule out this hypothesis, a generational change in preferences would likely 
have been associated with a global decrease in ratings for all items, as compared to current 
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older adults (as other types of items -yet unknown- would be preferred by the next generation). 
However, our participants reported that, compared to a current older adult, their peer would 
like stereotypically-young items more in the future and stereotypically-old items less. These 
findings therefore seem more compatible with an underestimation of change of preferences 
over time, such as a presentism bias, than with anticipated generational changes in preferences. 
One important aspect of our experimental design is that we asked our young 
participants to think about a very distant future (i.e., when they, or a peer, are 70). This allowed 
us to compare preferences of distant selves (as an older adult) with preferences of current older 
adults. Prior research on future thinking and projection bias has tended to focus on the 
immediate (i.e., next day; e.g., Gilbert et al., 2002) or relatively near future (i.e., about 10 years 
forward; e.g., Quoidbach et al., 2013). Our results thus illustrate that adults underestimate the 
extent to which their preferences will change over time even in the distant future. If anything, 
thinking about a distant future should have resulted in participants experiencing “discontinuity 
in their senses of self” (Lampinen, Odegard, & Leding, 2004) and envisaging larger scale changes 
as they grow old. The fact that our participants still predicted less change for themselves than 
for their peers indicates that this projection bias is robust to these discontinuities. It will be 
interesting in future studies to use intermediate future conditions to see if participants predict a 
progressive change in preferences over time, even if the amount of change never matches that 
attributed to peers, as demonstrated here for projections into the distant future.  
A few other studies have reported similar biases when thinking about the near or 
distant future. For instance, Remedios, Chasteen, and Packer (2010; see also Sharot, Korn, & 
Dolan, 2011) found an optimism bias when young adults (i.e., mean age: 19) had to describe 
themselves at the age of 70, consistent with past research on optimism bias about one’s own 
future (Sharot, 2011; Weinstein, 1980).  Broadly, as compared to temporally close future events, 
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distant future events are more abstract (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2000), 
contain less sensory and contextual details (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004), and are 
often represented in a third-, rather than in a first-, person perspective (D'Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004, 2012). This is compatible with the idea that thinking about distant future events 
may often involve semantic rather than episodic forms of future thinking (Atance & O'Neill, 
2001; Martin-Ordas, Atance, & Louw, 2012; Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014).  
In the present case, thinking about our future preferences may depend on subtypes of 
personal semantics such as self-knowledge and knowledge of autobiographical facts (reviewed 
in Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012), whereas thinking about the 
preferences of a generic other may rely on general semantics. The fact that the presentism bias 
and the optimism bias (Remedios et al., 2010) appear to be observed for the distant as well as 
for the near future suggests that the reliance on episodic (i.e., near future) versus personal 
semantics (i.e., distant future) may not be the crucial factor at work. Both of these types of 
memory handle self-relevant information and involve partly overlapping neural networks, such 
as medial prefrontal, restrosplenial and temporo-parietal cortices (Renoult et al., 2012). It may 
thus be, both for near and distant future simulations, that it is the use of our own personal 
perspective (accompanied by our sense of uniqueness) as a “judgmental anchor” (Davis et al., 
1986; Epley et al., 2004; Nickerson, 1999) that contaminates our attempts at future simulations. 
Accordingly, using general semantics to simulate the future of others results in a reduction of 
future simulation biases.    
As such, it will be interesting in future studies to include a familiar-other condition. For 
example, Grysman et al. (2013) have reported that the optimism bias was attenuated when 
thinking about a non-close friend, but similar when considering ourselves or a close friend. 
Interestingly, a number of neuroimaging studies have reported that the magnitude of self-other 
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differentiation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex depends on perceived similarity in 
personality traits (Benoit, Gilbert, Volle, & Burgess, 2010) or in-group membership (Morrison, 
Decety, & Molenberghs, 2012). It is thus likely that the strength of underestimation of change of 
preferences over time would be more similar between self and close-other than between self 
and a generic peer.  
Taken together, our results indicate that people’s underestimation of change in 
preferences over time is attenuated when thinking about others. However, bias still exists given 
that people’s estimated change in others’ preferences does not directly map onto their 
judgments about “current” older adults’ preferences. These findings have practical implications 
for decision-making because they suggest that simulating the future perspectives of a typical 
peer or, even better, the current perspectives of an older adult, prior to making simulations for 
self may lead to improved decision-making (e.g., saving more money for retirement). 
Importantly, reported similarities in judgments between self and close others suggest that more 
realistic future simulations may be attained when considering unknown/generic others, for 
whom we are more likely to escape the visceral aspects of self-relevance that are associated 
with presentism biases. 
Mis-predictions about the future are not trivial because they can lead people to make 
decisions in the present that are based on preferences, emotions, and personality traits that 
may shift in the future. Our results show that these mis-predictions of change are attenuated, 
but still present, when thinking about others, in turn suggesting both overlapping and distinct 
mechanisms in how we think about our own and others’ futures. 
 
Acknowledgments 
Page 19 of 25
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pqje
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
20 
 
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by grants from the Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada to P.S.R.D., V.T. and C.M.A., a grant from the 
Alzheimer Society of Canada to V.T.,  and a fellowship from the ‘Fonds de la Recherche en Santé 
du Québec’ (FRSQ) to L.R. 
 
References 
Atance, C. M., & O'Neill, D. K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. Trends in cognitive 
sciences, 5(12), 533-539. doi: Doi 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01804-0 
Baker, L. A., & Emery, R. E. (1993). When every relationship is above average. Law and 
Human Behavior, 17(4), 439-450.  
Bechara, A., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory 
of economic decision. Games and Economic Behavior, 52(2), 336-372. doi: DOI 
10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.010 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion, decision making and the 
orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3), 295-307. doi: 
10.1093/cercor/10.3.295 
Bélanger, M. J., Atance, C. M., Varghese, A. L., Nguyen, V., & Vendetti, C. (2014). 
What Will I Like Best When I'm All Grown Up? Preschoolers' Understanding of 
Future Preferences. Child Dev, 85(6), 2419-2431. doi: 10.1111/cdev.12282 
Benoit, R. G., Gilbert, S. J., Volle, E., & Burgess, P. W. (2010). When I think about me 
and simulate you: Medial rostral prefrontal cortex and self-referential processes. 
NeuroImage, 50(3), 1340-1349. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.12.091 
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends in 
cognitive sciences, 11(2), 49-57. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 
Cameron, J. J., Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2004). Autobiographical memory and self-
assessment. In D. R. Beike, J. M. Lampinen, & D. A. Behrend (Eds.), The Self 
and Memory (pp. 207-226). New York: Psychology Press. 
Chambers, J. R. (2008). Explaining False Uniqueness: Why We are Both Better and 
Worse Than Others. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(2), 878-894.  
D'Argembeau, A., Renaud, O., & Van der Linden, M. (2011). Frequency, Characteristics 
and Functions of Future-oriented Thoughts in Daily Life. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 25(1), 96-103. doi: Doi 10.1002/Acp.1647 
D'Argembeau, A., Ruby, P., Collette, F., Degueldre, C., Balteau, E., Luxen, A., . . . 
Salmon, E. (2007). Distinct regions of the medial prefrontal cortex are associated 
with self-referential processing and perspective taking. J Cogn Neurosci, 19(6), 
935-944. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2007.19.6.935 
D'Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2004). Phenomenal characteristics associated 
with projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: influence of 
valence and temporal distance. Conscious Cogn, 13(4), 844-858. doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.007 
Page 20 of 25
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pqje
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
21 
 
D'Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2012). Predicting the phenomenology of 
episodic future thoughts. Conscious Cogn. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.05.004 
Davis, H. L., Hoch, S. J., & Ragsdale, E. K. E. (1986). An Anchoring and Adjustment 
Model of Spousal Predictions. Journal of Consumer Research, 13(1), 25-37. doi: 
Doi 10.1086/209045 
Decety, J., & Grezes, J. (2006). The power of simulation: Imagining one's own and 
other's behavior. Brain research, 1079, 4-14. doi: DOI 
10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.115 
Denny, B. T., Kober, H., Wager, T. D., & Ochsner, K. N. (2012). A meta-analysis of 
functional neuroimaging studies of self- and other judgments reveals a spatial 
gradient for mentalizing in medial prefrontal cortex. J Cogn Neurosci, 24(8), 
1742-1752. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00233 
Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L., & Gilovich, T. (2004). Perspective taking as 
egocentric anchoring and adjustment. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 87(3), 327-339. doi: Doi 10.1037/0022-3514.87.3.327 
Gilbert, D. T., Gill, M. J., & Wilson, T. D. (2002). The future is now: Temporal 
correction in affective forecasting. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 88(1), 430-444. doi: DOI 10.1006/obhd.2001.2982 
Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing the future. Science, 
317(5843), 1351-1354. doi: DOI 10.1126/science.1144161 
Goldman, A. A. (2002). Simulation theory and mental concepts. In J. P. J. Dokic (Ed.), 
Simulation and Knowledge of Action (pp. 1-19). Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Gordon, R. M. (1986). Folk Psychology as Simulation. Mind & Language, 1(2), 158-171.  
Grysman, A., Prabhakar, J., Anglin, S. M., & Hudson, J. A. (2013). The time travelling 
self: comparing self and other in narratives of past and future events. Conscious 
Cogn, 22(3), 742-755. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.010 
Hassabis, D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007). Deconstructing episodic memory with 
construction. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(7), 299-306. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2007.05.001 
Lampinen, J. M., Odegard, T. N., & Leding, J. K. (2004). Diachronic Disunity. In D. R. 
Beike, J. M. Lampinen, & D. A. Behrend (Eds.), The Self and Memory (pp. 227-
253). New York: Psychology Press. 
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (1998). The role of feasibility and desirability considerations 
in near and distant future decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal 
of personality and social psychology, 75(1), 5-18. doi: Doi 10.1037//0022-
3514.75.1.5 
Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(3), 272-292. doi: DOI 
10.1006/obhd.1996.0028 
Loewenstein, G., O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2003). Projection bias in predicting 
future utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1209-1248. doi: Doi 
10.1162/003355303322552784 
Martin-Ordas, G., Atance, C. M., & Louw, A. (2012). The role of episodic and semantic 
memory in episodic foresight. Learning and Motivation, 43(4), 209-219. doi: DOI 
10.1016/j.lmot.2012.05.011 
Page 21 of 25
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pqje
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
22 
 
Morrison, S., Decety, J., & Molenberghs, P. (2012). The neuroscience of group 
membership. Neuropsychologia, 50(8), 2114-2120. doi: DOI 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.05.014 
Murray, R. J., Schaer, M., & Debbane, M. (2012). Degrees of separation: a quantitative 
neuroimaging meta-analysis investigating self-specificity and shared neural 
activation between self- and other-reflection. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 36(3), 
1043-1059. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.013 
Naqvi, N., Shiv, B., & Bechara, A. (2006). The role of emotion in decision making: A 
cognitive neuroscience perspective. Curr Dir Psychol Sci, 15(5), 260-264. doi: 
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00448.x 
Nickerson, R. S. (1999). How we know - and sometimes misjudge - What others know: 
Imputing one's own knowledge to others. Psychological bulletin, 125(6), 737-759. 
doi: Doi 10.1037//0033-2909.125.6.737 
Quoidbach, J., Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2013). The End of History Illusion. 
Science, 339(6115), 96-98. doi: DOI 10.1126/science.1229294 
Remedios, J. D., Chasteen, A. L., & Packer, D. J. (2010). Sunny Side Up: The Reliance 
on Positive Age Stereotypes in Descriptions of Future Older Selves. Self and 
Identity, 9(3), 257-275. doi: Pii 913840139 
Doi 10.1080/15298860903054175 
Renoult, L., Davidson, P. S., Palombo, D. J., Moscovitch, M., & Levine, B. (2012). 
Personal semantics: at the crossroads of semantic and episodic memory. Trends 
Cogn Sci, 16(11), 550-558. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.003 
Robinson, H., Calamia, M., Glascher, J., Bruss, J., & Tranel, D. (2014). Neuroanatomical 
correlates of executive functions: a neuropsychological approach using the 
EXAMINER battery. J Int Neuropsychol Soc, 20(1), 52-63. doi: 
10.1017/S135561771300060X 
Sharot, T. (2011). The optimism bias. Current Biology, 21(23), R941-R945.  
Sharot, T., Korn, C. W., & Dolan, R. J. (2011). How unrealistic optimism is maintained 
in the face of reality. Nature neuroscience, 14(11), 1475-U1156. doi: Doi 
10.1038/Nn.2949 
Szpunar, K. K., Spreng, R. N., & Schacter, D. L. (2014). A taxonomy of prospection: 
Introducing an organizational framework for future-oriented cognition. Proc Natl 
Acad Sci U S A. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1417144111 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2000). Temporal construal and time-dependent changes in 
preference. Journal of personality and social psychology, 79(6), 876-889. doi: 
Doi 10.1037//0022-3514.79.6.876 
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events. Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 39(5), 806-820. doi: Doi 10.1037/0022-
3514.39.5.806 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 22 of 25
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pqje
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Legend 
Figure 1: Average preference ratings. Mean preference ratings (with 95% confidence interval 
bars) for self and a same-sex peer “now” and in the future are represented, as well as mean 
current preferences of an older adult. Participants indicated their preferences using a 7-point 
Likert scale (from 1-strongly dislike to 7-strongly like) separately for stereotypically-young-items 
(e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations; here represented in red) and stereotypically-old items 
(e.g., jazz, playing bridge; in blue). 
 
Appendix 
Stereotypically-young-person things:   
Energy Drinks         
Adventure vacations 
Canoe camping 
Rollerblading 
Converse sneakers 
Top 40 music 
American Eagle Outfitters 
Facebook 
Texting 
Living downtown 
Bungee jumping 
Whitewater rafting 
 
Stereotypically-old-person things: 
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Playing bridge 
Dinner at 5 
Jazz 
Sears department store 
Oldsmobile 
Game shows 
Suspenders 
Scrapbooking 
English breakfast tea 
Living in the suburbs 
Birdwatching 
Gardening 
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Average preference ratings. Mean preference ratings (with 95% confidence interval bars) for self and a 
same-sex peer “now” and in the future are represented, as well as mean current preferences of an older 
adult. Participants indicated their preferences using a 7-point Likert scale (from 1-strongly dislike to 7-
strongly like) separately for stereotypically-young-items (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations; here 
represented in red) and stereotypically-old items (e.g., jazz, playing bridge; in blue).  
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